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In classical two-party computation, a trusted initializer who prepares certain initial correlations,
known as one-time tables, can help make the inputs of both parties information-theoretically secure.
We propose some bipartite quantum protocols with possible aborts for approximately generating
such bipartite classical correlations with varying degrees of privacy, without introducing a third
party. Under some weak requirements for the parties, the security level is nontrivial for use in
bipartite computation. We show that the security is usually dependent on the noise level, but not
for some party in one of the protocols. The security is “forced security”, which implies that the
probability that some useful one-time tables are generated can approach 1 in the noiseless case
under quite weak assumptions about the parties, although the protocols allow aborts. We show how
to use the generated one-time tables to achieve nontrivial information-theoretic security in generic
two-party classical or quantum computation tasks, including (interactive) quantum homomorphic
encryption. Our methods provide check-based implementations of some no-signaling correlations,
including the PR-box type, with the help of communication which carry no information about the
inputs in the generated correlations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of two-party computation is a main re-
search topic in classical cryptography. The goal is usu-
ally to correctly compute some function of the inputs
from the two parties, while keeping the inputs as private
from the opposite party as possible. This has been stud-
ied using classical homomorphic encryption techniques
[1, 2] or through implementing Yao’s “Garbled Circuit”
solution [3]. Another possibility is to introduce a trusted
third party, who may sometimes interact with the two
parties for multiple rounds. To lower the requirement on
the trusted third party, a “trusted initializer” has been
proposed [4]. Such trusted initializer only prepares some
initial correlations between the two parties, and does not
interact with any party afterwards. A trusted initializer
who prepares certain initial correlations, referred to as
“one-time tables”, can help make the bipartite computa-
tion secure.
Secure two-party quantum computation is the corre-
sponding problem in quantum computing and quantum
cryptography. The two parties wish to correctly com-
pute an output according to some public or private pro-
gram while keeping their (quantum) inputs as secure as
possible. Special cases of this general problem include
quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) [5–17], secure
assisted quantum computation [18, 19], computing on
∗Electronic address: yupapers@sina.com
shared quantum secrets [20], and physically-motivated
secure computation (e.g. [21]). In the study of QHE, it
is found that secure computation of the modulo-2 inner
product of two bit strings provided by the two parties
is a key task, and the one-time tables mentioned above
turn out to be helpful for this task.
In this work, we propose two-party quantum protocols
with aborts as replacements for the trusted initializer in
preparing the one-time tables, and show that the pre-
pared one-time tables can help achieve nontrivial degrees
of information-theoretic security in bipartite classical or
quantum computation. Our main protocols are based
on Protocol 1 which implements the following task with
partial privacy: it takes as input two locally-generated
uniformly random bits x and y from Alice and Bob, re-
spectively, and outputs (xAND y) XOR r on Alice’s side
and r on Bob’s side, where r is a uniformly random bit.
The one-time table contains four bits: two input bits
and two output bits. By putting the possible aborts in
the preprocessing which does not involve useful data, we
partly avoid the problem of data leakage in those aborted
runs in other possible protocols with aborts.
Security in quantum key distribution [22] is dependent
on verifications. Inspired by this, we propose some proto-
cols that verify the correctness of Protocol 1. We propose
Protocol 2 to select some one-time tables generated by
Protocol 1. It allows Bob to abort during the protocol
when he finds that Alice is cheating. When Protocol 2 is
used in a generic interactive bipartite classical computa-
tion with the roles of Alice and Bob switched, the data
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2leakage of Alice is asymptotically vanishing for noiseless
physical systems, but for noisy physical systems, the leak-
age is linearly related to the noise level. The data privacy
of Bob is partial: the leakage is about half of his input
bits, but the privacy is better in the case that the function
is a many-to-one map for Bob’s input, including the case
that the function effectively evaluates universal circuits.
We then propose Protocol 3 which includes checks from
both sides to ensure that the average rate of cheating by
any party is asymptotically vanishing. For the bipar-
tite computation task, the data leakage of any party is
asymptotically vanishing for noiseless systems, while for
noisy systems, the leakage of both parties are linearly
related to the noise level.
We then propose Protocol 4 which combines several
one-time tables generated by Protocol 2 or 3 into one.
When Protocol 4 based on Protocol 2 is used in bipartite
classical computation, the data leakage of Alice is expo-
nentially small, so it is almost independent of the physical
noise, while some polynomial overhead is needed to make
the data privacy of Bob comparable to that in Protocol 2.
But such polynomial overhead is not too bad, since the
function to be computed can be recompiled in general,
as discussed in Sec. VII.
All the protocols above are secure in the honest-but-
curious model. An honest-but-curious party is one who
follows the protocol while possibly making measurements
which do not affect the final computation result. In
our protocols, an honest-but-curious party does not learn
anything about the other party’s data, while the privacy
of his or her own data is guaranteed to reach the targeted
level even if the other party cheats.
The following remarks are for the general malicious
case. In Protocol 2, the security of Bob’s data is depen-
dent on that he is conservative, meaning that he values
the privacy of his data higher than the possibility to learn
Alice’s data; Alice needs to be weakly cooperating for the
protocols not to abort, meaning that she does not cheat
much in some batch of the instances of Protocol 1. For
Alice’s data security to be enhanced by her verifications
in Protocol 3, she should be conservative in the sense
described above. But partly due to the possible aborts,
it actually suffices to assume one of the parties is con-
servative in Protocol 3, since then the other party might
as well be conservative to reach a better security level
for himself (herself). Although Protocol 4 is quite effec-
tive when there is no noise (including errors), it may not
be better than Protocol 2 or 3 when there is some non-
negligible level of noise. In the noisy case, we propose
just using Protocol 3.
The security of the protocols is “forced security”,
which means Alice is forced by Bob’s checks to not cheat
in some batches of Protocol 1. It implies that the prob-
ability that some one-time tables with targeted (partial)
security are generated would approach 1 in the noise-
less case under quite weak assumptions about the parties
(that Alice weakly cooperates by not cheating in some
batches of Protocol 1, and Bob indeed does the checks
due to that he is conservative), although the protocols
allow aborts.
We show some applications in general two-party clas-
sical computation, and the check-based implementations
of oblivious transfer and bit commitment under some
assumptions mentioned above. To enjoy some quan-
tum speedup together with the security benefit brought
about by our preprocessing, we propose an interactive
QHE scheme with costs polynomial in circuit size, as well
as a constant-round QHE scheme with exponential cost,
which use the precomputed one-time tables as a resource,
but both schemes have more rounds of communication
than in the original definition of QHE. Such scheme is
then generalized to general two-party quantum compu-
tation with a publicly known circuit and private inputs on
both parties, and to the case of private circuit provided
by one party and private inputs on both parties. Our
protocols provide check-based implementations of some
no-signaling correlations with the help of classical com-
munication which do not carry information about the
inputs in the generated correlations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
contains some introduction of the background. In Sec. III
we introduce the quantum protocols for generating the
one-time tables. Sec. IV shows applications in general
two-party classical computation. Sec. V shows applica-
tions in general two-party quantum computation. Sec. VI
shows applications in check-based implementations of
some no-signaling correlations with the help of classi-
cal communication. Sec. VII contains some discussions
about the security in the noisy case, and physical imple-
mentations. Sec. VIII contains the conclusion and some
open problems.
II. PRELIMINARIES
On computing two-party classical functions with quan-
tum circuits, Lo [23] studied the data privacy for publicly
3known classical functions with the output on one party
only. Buhrman et al [24] studied the security of two-
party quantum computation for publicly known classical
functions in the case that both parties know the outcome,
although with some limitations in the security notions.
These and other results in the literature [25] suggest that
secure bipartite classical computing cannot be generally
done by quantum protocols where the two parties have
full quantum capabilities. In the current work, the proto-
cols allow aborts in the quantum preprocessing (Bob may
abort when he detects that Alice has cheated), so the sce-
nario considered here does not fit into the assumptions in
the works mentioned above. We assume that one party
values the privacy of his data higher than the possibility
to learn the other party’s data. Under such assumption,
we do not require the parties in the main bipartite com-
putation stage to be entirely classical.
Next, we introduce the simplest case in the one-time
tables [4]. The bipartite AND gate with distributed out-
put is a gate that takes as input two distant bits a and
b, and outputs (a · b) ⊕ r and r on the two parties, re-
spectively, where r is a uniformly random bit. (XOR is
denoted as ⊕; AND is denoted as the · symbol.) It is
sufficient for secure two-party classical computation, al-
though there may be other constructions. Theoretically,
the bipartite AND gate with distributed output on two
distant input bits a and b can be computed while keep-
ing both input bits completely private, with the help of
a precomputed ideal one-time table of the nonlocal-AND
type. Such one-time table has two locally-generated uni-
formly random bits x and y on Alice’s and Bob’s side,
respectively, and also has (x · y)⊕ r and r on Alice’s and
Bob’s side, respectively, where r is a uniformly random
bit. The steps for the bipartite AND-gate computation
with distributed output are as follows:
1. Alice announces a′ = a ⊕ x. Bob announces b′ =
b⊕ y.
2. Each party calculates an output bit according to the
one-time table and the received message. Alice’s output
is (x · b′)⊕ (x · y)⊕ r. Bob’s output is (a′ · b)⊕ r.
The XOR of the two output bits is (x · b′) ⊕ (x · y) ⊕
r⊕ (a′ · b)⊕ r = a · b, while each output bit is a uniformly
random bit when viewed alone, because r is a uniformly
random bit. Since the messages a′ and b′ do not con-
tain any information about a and b, the desired bipartite
AND gate is implemented while a and b are still perfectly
private.
Some notations are as follows. By “forced security”,
we mean that the security in a protocol is guaranteed by
verifications where failure to pass them would cause the
protocol to abort. By saying that a protocol is “cheat-
sensitive”, we mean that any cheating will probably cause
the protocol to abort.
III. THE QUANTUM PROTOCOLS FOR
GENERATING ONE-TIME TABLES
The main quantum protocols to be introduced later
are based on Protocol 1, which is the revised version of a
subprocedure of a protocol from [26]. The Protocol 1 ef-
fectively computes an AND function on two remote clas-
sical bits from the two parties, with the output being
a distributed bit, i.e. the XOR of two bits on the two
parties. The security is not ideal: the plain use of such
protocol would give rise to non-ideal security in (inter-
active) quantum homomorphic encryption [26], and the
security is such that some additional verification need to
be added in the protocol for it to be nontrivial. Later we
propose protocols that check and sometimes combine the
one-time tables generated from Protocol 1, to be used as
a preprocessing stage for a bipartite classical or quantum
computation task.
Some notations are as follows. Denote |0˜〉 = |+〉 :=
1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), and |1˜〉 = |−〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), and the
random bits are unbiased and independent of other vari-
ables by default. An EPR pair is two qubits in the state
1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). The Protocol 1 involves direct sending
of states, while the Protocol 9 in Appendix A is the cor-
responding entanglement-based variant. The Protocol 9
uses prior shared entanglement to remotely prepare some
state on Bob’s side via Alice’s local measurements, and it
also involves a step of teleportation [27] from Bob to Alice
with partial information about the corrections withheld
by the sending party. The teleportation approach allows
Alice and Bob to do operations simultaneously, see the
discussions in Secs. VI and VII. These two protocols cru-
cially depends on the property of the CNOT gate: it is
equivalent to a CNOT gate in the reverse direction (with
the roles of the two qubits switched) in an unbiased basis.
In Protocol 1, Alice’s input bit has partial privacy even
for a cheating Bob, while Bob’s input bit is secure for an
honest-but-curious Alice, but is not secure at all for a
cheating Alice. The privacy of Alice’s input bit x can be
quantified using the accessible information or the trace
distance. The accessible information, i.e. the maximum
classical mutual information corresponding to Bob’s pos-
4Protocol 1 A quantum protocol for generating one-time tables with partial privacy
Input: A random bit x from Alice and a random bit y from Bob.
Output: (x · y)⊕ r on Alice’s side, and r on Bob’s side, where r is a random bit.
The input and output together form the one-time table.
1. Alice generates two random bits s and t. If s = 0, she prepares the state |x〉|t〉; if s = 1, she prepares the state |t˜〉|x˜〉,
where the tilde represents X-basis encoding. She sends the prepared two-qubit state to Bob.
2. Bob receives the two qubits. If y = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on the two qubits, with the first qubit being the control
qubit.
3. He generates two random bits h1 and h2. He does a σy gate on any qubit where the corresponding bit hj (j = 1, 2) is 1.
He generates a random bit p. If p = 1, he does σz gates on both qubits. He sends the two qubits to Alice. The bit
h := h1 ⊕ h2 is his output.
4. Alice receives the two qubits. If s = 0, Alice measures the two received qubits in the Z basis, otherwise she measures
them in the X basis. She calculates the XOR of three bits: the two outcome bits, and the t. The obtained bit is her
output.
sible knowledge about Alice’s input, is exactly 12 bits,
which happens to be equal to the Holevo bound in the
current case. For a cheating Bob to get the maximum
amount of information, his best measurement strategy in
the current case is to use a fixed projective measurement:
to measure the first qubit in the Z basis, and the second
qubit in the X basis. The trace distance of the two den-
sity operators for Alice’s two possible input values is 12 ,
by direct calculation. Thus, the probability that Bob
guesses Alice’s input bit correctly is (1+ 12 ) · 12 = 34 . Note
that with this particular measurement just mentioned,
he cannot make the distributed output of the one-time
table correct. In other words, Bob cannot learn the other
party’s input without consequences.
To learn about Bob’s input bit, a cheating Alice may
use an entangled state 12 (|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉 − |11〉). From
Bob’s returned state, Alice may find out Bob’s input bit
with certainty. But in such case Alice has no effective
input to speak of, and she does not know Bob’s output
bit h, so even if she chooses an input bit for herself later,
she cannot determine her output bit for making the dis-
tributed output correct.
The entanglement-based version for Protocol 1 is Pro-
tocol 9 in Appendix A, where we explain why its security
is weaker than that of the direct-sending version.
In the following we present protocols which check or
combine the one-time tables generated in Protocol 1. The
first one has partial security for Alice and near-perfect
security for Bob, while the second one involves checking
by both parties, and aims for near-perfect security for
both parties. The third one aims for near-perfect security
for both parties with emphasis on the security of one
party.
In Protocol 2, Alice’s input bit has partial privacy,
which is the same as in the analysis of Protocol 1 above.
When the ratio Km is near one, the nonlocal correlations
in the remaining unchecked one-time tables can be re-
garded as almost surely correct. This is because of Bob’s
checking. We require Alice to be weakly cooperating,
that is, she does not cheat in some of the batches of in-
stances, since otherwise no one-time table may pass the
test. Some degree of weak cooperation is required for two
parties to perform a computation anyway, and the above
assumption of Alice has no effect on the data security
of any party when Bob satisfies the assumption below,
thus we may ignore the assumption above and just state
the following assumption on Bob as the requirement of
our protocols. In the following we assume that Bob is
conservative, which means that he values the privacy of
his data higher than the possibility to learn Alice’s data.
Later in Sec. IV we will see that it effectively implies that
he indeed does the checking. For an honest-but-curious
Alice, the resulting correlation is correct, and she does
not learn anything about Bob’s input bit y (using the
notations in Protocol 1, same below). In the following
we discuss the case that Alice cheats.
If Alice cheats and gets at least partial information
about Bob’s input bit y, the state sent from Alice to Bob
must be different from what is specified in the protocol;
her best choice of state for cheating is mentioned pre-
viously. To pass Bob’s test while learning about Bob’s
input y, she should know both y and r, or know both
y and y ⊕ r. (The two conditions are equivalent in the
exact case, but not necessarily equivalent in the partial-
5Protocol 2 A partly-secure protocol for checking the one-time tables
1. Alice and Bob perform many instances of Protocol 1 (sequentially or in parallel) to generate some one-time tables, and
exchange messages to agree on which instances were successfully implemented experimentally. Suppose m one-time tables
were implemented. The one-time tables labeled by j has inputs aj and bj , and outputs ej and fj .
2. Bob randomly selects K integers in {1, · · · ,m}, which are labels for which one-time table. He tells his choices to Alice.
The integer K satisfies that m−K is an upper bound on the number of required one-time tables in the main bipartite
computing task, and the ratio K
m
is related to the targeted security level of the overall computation.
3. Alice sends the bits aj and ej to Bob for all chosen labels j.
4. For any chosen label j, Bob checks whether aj and ej satisfy that aj · bj = ej⊕fj . If the total number of failures is larger
than some preset number of Bob’s (e.g. 0, or a small constant times K), he aborts the protocol, or restarts the protocol
to do testing on a new batch of instances of Protocol 1 if the two parties still want to perform some secure two-party
computation. Otherwise, the remaining one-time tables are regarded as having passed the checking and will be used later
in the two-party computing task. They may repeat the steps above to prepare more one-time tables on demand.
information case.) In the following, let IMy denote the
classical mutual information learnable by Alice about
Bob’s bit y (with uniform prior distribution) if she uses
the measurement M on the received two qubits (possi-
bly a POVM measurement), in an instance of Protocol 1.
The IMr and I
M
y⊕r are defined similarly, but note that they
are conditioned on the uniform distribution for y, similar
to the case of IMy .
Proposition 1. In Protocol 1, the following inequalities
hold:
IMy + I
M
r ≤ 1, (1)
IMy + I
M
y⊕r ≤ 1, (2)
IMy + max(I
M
r , I
M
y⊕r) ≤ 1. (3)
where the two M are the same in each equation. All
the quantities on the left-hand-sides are also dependent
on Bob’s received state σA. It is effectively prepared by
Alice, and is a mixed state on two qubits (in numerical
calculations, it is viewed as a pure state on two of Bob’s
qubits and two imaginary ancillary qubits), and the two
σA are the same in each equation. We abbreviate the
symbol σA.
Note that the relationship between σA and x is as fol-
lows: if Alice is honest, the σA is determined by the
choice of x according to Protocol 1 up to some Pauli
operators (arising from the teleportations in Step 2 of
Protocol 1). If Alice is dishonest, the σA is not necessar-
ily related to x (since the latter may be undefined), and
it may be a mixed state in Bob’s view, but Alice may
hold the purification for it, where the purification system
needs to include two ancillary qubits at most. In defining
σA, we use Bob’s received state instead of Alice’s input
state before teleportation, since it is more general: Alice
could cheat by changing her operations to deviate from
the original operations in the teleportation, but she al-
ways effectively prepares a (mixed) state on Bob’s two
qubits no matter what she does.
Proof. Suppose σA is Bob’s received two-qubit mixed
state. The overall communication from Bob to Alice in
Protocol 1 is effectively only one classical bit, since if Bob
randomly performs a σz gate on his first sent qubit, the
sent two qubits would be in a maximally mixed state,
containing no information for Alice. Also note that there
are effectively no other prior correlations between the two
parties besides the fixed entangled state, so the locking
of information [28] does not occur here. The amount of
information that Alice learns about the joint distribution
of y and r is upper bounded by 1 bit. The bits y and r
are independent when Bob produces them, so the y and r
are independent prior to Alice’s measurement. Thus the
inequality (1) holds, where we have assumed that the two
σA implicit in the information quantities are the same in
this equation (same below). The bits y and y ⊕ r jointly
determine y and r, and vice versa, so the amount of infor-
mation that Alice learns about the joint distribution of y
and y⊕r is upper bounded by 1 bit. And since the bits y
and y⊕ r are independent prior to Alice’s measurement,
we have that the inequality (2) holds. The inequalities
(1) and (2) together imply (3). uunionsq
The probability that Alice passes Bob’s test at a partic-
ular instance is related to the max(IMr , I
M
y⊕r) in Eq. (3).
When the probability of passing approaches 1, such max-
imum approaches 1, then it must be that one of them
approaches 1. Then, Prop. 1 implies that Alice can learn
6almost nothing about y if she measured in the same ba-
sis, but in fact a cheating Alice knows which instances are
remaining and will not be checked later (although it is
conceivable that some checks may be done after the main
computation, see Sec. VII below), so she can choose to do
any measurement on the received states in these remain-
ing instances. Such measurement may not be the same
as M in the other term in Eq. (3). This implies that
Eq. (3) alone is not sufficient for proving the security of
Protocol 2.
Theorem 1. In Protocol 2, Bob’s input is asymptotically
secure.
Proof. We first consider the case that Alice’s operations
are independent among different instances of Protocol 1,
and at last comment that the non-independent case still
satisfy the extreme case of the inequalities above, giving
rise to the security of Protocol 2.
Due to the freedom of measurement basis choice men-
tioned above, the Holevo bounds, which are upper
bounds of the information quantities, are more relevant
for proving the security of Protocol 2. Under the condi-
tion that Alice’s operations are independent among the
instances, we need only consider the Holevo bounds for
a single instance of Protocol 1. Let χy be the Holevo
quantity which is the upper bound for IMy . It is defined
as
χy = S(ρ)− 1
2
2∑
j=1
S(ρj), (4)
where ρj is the density operator that Alice receives from
Bob for the case of y = j after Pauli corrections deter-
mined by Bob’s sent bit, and ρ = 12 (ρ1 + ρ2). The S
represents the von Neumann entropy. The definition of
χy shows that it is conditioned on the uniform prior dis-
tribution for y. The quantities χr and χy⊕r are defined
similarly and are also conditioned on the uniform prior
distribution for y. We claim that the following inequality
holds for small positive  and a nonnegative continuous
function f(),
χy + max(χr, χy⊕r) ≤ 1 + f(),
for max(χr, χy⊕r) ≥ 1− ,
where f is continuous and f(0) = 0. (5)
The reason is as follows. The Holevo quantities in Eq. (5)
satisfy uniform continuity, because of the combination of
the following two reasons: the ancilla in Alice’s initial
state σA (introduced in Prop. 1) is effectively at most 4
dimensions due to the Schmidt decomposition, and note
that such ancilla is also the ancilla for Alice’s final state;
the Holevo quantity χy in (4) is continuous as a function
of ρ1 and ρ2 and is therefore a continuous function of
Alice’s initial state σA, and similarly, the Holevo quanti-
ties χr and χy⊕r are also continuous functions of Alice’s
initial state σA. Given that the Holevo quantities satisfy
uniform continuity, we obtain Eq. (5) by noting the fact
that
max(χr, χy⊕r) = 1 =⇒ χy = 0, (6)
where Eq. (6) holds because max(χr, χy⊕r) = 1 implies
that max(IMr , I
M
y⊕r) = 1 for some M, and the latter im-
plies χy = 0 due to the following argument: suppose
IMr = 1 (the case that I
M
y⊕r = 1 is similar), and consider
the four density operators on Alice’s side correspond-
ing to four different combinations of y and r, then the
two pairs corresponding to different r must be orthogo-
nal across the pairs. Then if the states in one pair are
partially distinguishable, the left-hand-side of (3) would
be greater than 1 for some M, which violates Prop 1.
The above arguments shows that max(IMr , I
M
y⊕r) = 1 for
some M implies χy = 0, hence Eq. (6) holds.
Alice may cheat in some instances of Protocol 1 so we
may define a rate of cheating. Partial cheating in a in-
stance is converted into a fractional number of cheating
instances in calculating such rate. Alice’s cheating proba-
bilities among different instances may be correlated, but
that does not affect the following argument since Bob
randomly chooses which instances to check. It is sort
of subjective for Bob to determine the average rate of
cheating from the number of wrong results and the total
number of tests in Protocol 2, since it depends on the a
priori knowledge about the probability distribution for
Alice’s average rate of cheating, and also depends on the
correlations between rates of cheating among different in-
stances of Protocol 1. Suppose that after some checking,
Bob estimates that Alice’s average rate of cheating is ,
which is a small positive constant near 0, then the follow-
ing estimate holds for the uniform distribution of y and
r (the uniform distribution of y can be imposed by Bob
since he wants to make Alice’s cheating be detected, and
the r has uniform distribution according to Protocol 1):
max(χr, χy⊕r) ≥ 1 − . Hence, χy ≤  + f() according
to Eq. (5). This shows that the expected amount of in-
formation about y learnable by a cheating Alice in the
remaining instances of Protocol 1 is arbitrarily near zero
for sufficiently small , even if she measures in different
bases from those for the tested instances. The word “ex-
7pected” means that even if L < 1, where L is the total
number of one-time tables to be used for the main com-
putation, Alice may sometimes learn about one or a few
bits of Bob’s input by chance, but on average, she learns
not more than L bits. Since the information about y
is linearly related to the information learnable by Alice
in the later main computation stage (see the bipartite
AND-gate computation method in Sec. II), this shows
the security of Protocol 2 in the case that Alice’s opera-
tions are independent among instances of Protocol 1.
In the following we consider the general case that Al-
ice’s operations are not necessarily independent among
instances of Protocol 1. If Alice initially prepares some
correlated quantum states among m instances, the gen-
eralization of Eq. (6) should hold, due to the similar rea-
son as that after Eq. (6). Then the generalization of
Eq. (5) for the corresponding Holevo bounds should hold
approximately near such extreme point, due to the uni-
form continuity of the Holevo bounds (as functions of
the joint state on Bob’s side on multiple subsystems).
Since Bob’s variables y and r are independent among the
instances, the generalizations of Eq. (5) just mentioned
have the same scaling near the extreme point (as the
number of instances of Protocol 1 grow) as in the case
that Alice’s operations are independent. This shows that
the argument for the security for the case of independent
operations of Alice can be extended to the general case.
uunionsq
Some numerical results are in Appendix B.
To improve Alice’s security in the protocol above, we
propose the following Protocol 3, in which Alice also does
some checking about Bob’s behavior.
By noting that there is effectively only one bit of clas-
sical communication from Alice to Bob in Protocol 1,
the analysis for Protocol 2 about Bob’s data privacy can
provide hints for analyzing Alice’s data privacy in Pro-
tocol 3. There are analogues of Prop. 1 and Theorem 1
for Alice instead of Bob, see Prop. 2 and Theorem 2 be-
low. To draw an analogy to the analysis of Protocol 2,
note that the output bits of Protocol 1 can alternatively
be written as r′ on Alice’s side and (x · y)⊕ r′ on Bob’s
side, respectively, where r′ is a uniformly random bit. We
state the following results. The IMx is the classical mutual
information learnable by Bob about Alice’s input x us-
ing measurementM, in an instance of Protocol 1, where
the M incorporates his possible CNOT gate, some Pauli
corrections or equivalently some classical postprocessing,
and Bell-state measurement with withheld masks. And
the other quantities are defined similarly.
Proposition 2. In Protocol 1, the follows inequalities
hold:
IMx + I
M
r′ ≤ 1, (7)
IMx + I
M
x⊕r′ ≤ 1, (8)
IMx + max(I
M
r′ , I
M
x⊕r′) ≤ 1. (9)
where the two M are the same in each equation.
Proof. The overall communication from Alice to Bob in
Protocol 1 is effectively only one classical bit, since Alice
could apply an arbitrary Pauli operator to the qubit not
encoding x, while applying a σz to the qubit encoding
x if it is encoded in the Z basis, or a σx to the qubit
encoding x if it is encoded in the X basis. The protocol
still works under these changes, with Alice’s recording of
the value of t changed. Then, if Alice further applies a
Pauli operator, the two qubits sent to Bob would be in
a maximally mixed state, containing no information for
Bob. This shows that the overall communication from
Alice to Bob in Protocol 1 is effectively only one classi-
cal bit. Thus the amount of information that Bob learns
about the joint distribution of x and r′ is upper bounded
by 1 bit. (As mentioned below, the value of r′ is depen-
dent on t, so it is not decided by Bob.) The bits x and r′
are independent, because r′ is an independent uniformly
random bit, by the construction of Protocol 1: she takes
the XOR of some intermediate result and a uniformly
random bit t (generated by herself and independent from
x) in the last step of Protocol 1. Thus the inequality (7)
holds. The bits x and x⊕ r′ jointly determine x and r′,
and vice versa, so the amount of information that Bob
learns about the joint distribution of x and x⊕r′ is upper
bounded by 1 bit. And since the bits x and x ⊕ r′ are
independent, we have that the inequality (8) holds. The
inequalities (7) and (8) together imply (9). uunionsq
Theorem 2. In Protocol 3, Alice’s input is asymptoti-
cally secure.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we may define
the Holevo quantities χx, χr′ and χx⊕r′ , which are con-
ditioned on the uniform prior distribution for x. For the
similar reasons as in the proof of Theorem 1, the follow-
ing inequality holds for small positive  and a nonnegative
continuous function g(),
χx + max(χr′ , χx⊕r′) ≤ 1 + g(),
for max(χr′ , χx⊕r′) ≥ 1− ,
where g is continuous and g(0) = 0. (10)
8Protocol 3 A protocol for checking the one-time tables by both parties
1. Alice and Bob perform many instances of Protocol 1 to generate some one-time tables, and exchange messages to agree
on which instances were successfully implemented experimentally. Suppose m one-time tables were implemented. The
one-time tables labeled by j has inputs aj and bj , and outputs ej and fj .
2. (The steps 2 to 4 can be done concurrently with the steps 5 to 7.) Bob randomly selects KB integers in {1, · · · ,m},
which are labels for which one-time table. He tells his choices to Alice.
3. Alice sends the bits aj and ej to Bob for all chosen labels j.
4. For any chosen label j, Bob checks whether aj and ej satisfy that aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj . If the total number of failures is
larger than some preset number of Bob’s (e.g. 0, or a small constant times m), he aborts the protocol, or asks Alice to
restart the protocol to do testing on a new batch of instances of Protocol 1 if the two parties still want to perform some
secure two-party computation.
5. Alice randomly chooses KA integers in {1, · · · ,m}, and tells Bob her choices. The chosen set of integers may overlap
with the set chosen by Bob.
6. Bob sends the bits bj and fj to Alice for the chosen labels j.
7. For any chosen label j, Alice checks whether aj · bj = ej ⊕ fj holds. If the total number of failures is larger than some
preset number of Alice’s, she aborts the protocol, or asks Bob to restart the protocol if needed.
8. The remaining one-time tables are regarded as having passed the checking and will be used later in the two-party
computing task. They may repeat the steps above to prepare more one-time tables on demand.
Note that to show the inequality (10) is correct, we need
the following implication:
max(χr′ , χx⊕r′) = 1 =⇒ χx = 0. (11)
The implication in Eq. (11) holds because
max(χr′ , χx⊕r′) = 1 implies that max(IMr′ , I
M
x⊕r′) = 1 for
some measurement M of Bob’s, and the latter implies
χx = 0 due to the following argument. Suppose I
M
r′ = 1
(the case that IMx⊕r′ = 1 is similar), and consider the
four density operators on Bob’s side corresponding to
four different combinations of x and r′, then the two
pairs corresponding to different r′ must be orthogonal
across the pairs. Then if the states in a pair are partially
distinguishable, the left-hand-side of (9) would be
greater than 1 for some M, which violates Prop 2. This
shows that max(IMr′ , I
M
x⊕r′) = 1 for some M implies
χx = 0, hence Eq. (11) holds.
In the case that Bob’s operations are independent
among instances of Protocol 1, the security of Alice’s
input in Protocol 2 then follows, for the similar reasons
as in the proof of Theorem 1.
In the following we consider the general case that Bob’s
operations are not independent among instances of Pro-
tocol 1. In such case, the generalization of Eq. (11)
should hold, due to the similar reason as that after
Eq. (11). Then the generalization of Eq. (10) for the
corresponding Holevo bounds should hold approximately
near such extreme point, due to the uniform continuity
of the Holevo bounds (as functions of Bob’s operations
and his messages sent to Alice). This shows that the
argument for the security for the case of independent op-
erations of Bob can be extended to the general case. uunionsq
It should be noted that when χx is near 0, there is
still some exponentially small probability that Bob may
learn quite a significant portion of the information about
x in the remaining unchecked instances. The quantita-
tive security level is different from that obtainable by
directly adapting Theorem 1 with the roles of two par-
ties switched, at least on the following two points. First,
Alice’s data privacy has a nonzero lower bound here, see
the analysis below Protocol 1. Second, with the same
resource cost, Bob’s data privacy is somewhat weaker
than that in Protocol 2, since some of the one-time tables
are used for Alice’s checking now. Bob effectively checks
about half of the instances as in Protocol 2, and Alice
checks the other half. But the security should not be
much worse since Bob randomly chooses which instances
to check.
In Protocol 3, if any one party is conservative, his (her)
data privacy is guaranteed. But partly due to the possi-
ble aborts, it actually suffices to assume either one of the
parties is conservative in Protocol 3, since then the other
party might as well be conservative to reach a better se-
curity level for himself (herself).
When one party’s data privacy is very important, and
9the other party’s data privacy is not too important, we
propose the following Protocol 4. It improves the privacy
of Alice’s input in the later main computation task, while
that of Bob’s input is somewhat compromised.
In Protocol 4, the privacy of Alice’s bit x for the com-
bined one-time table is quite good: The accessible infor-
mation for Bob is exactly 1
2k
bits, where k is the size
of S in protocol description. It is because the different
one-time tables from the first step are independent. The
Holevo bound coincides with the accessible information
in the current case.
For the privacy of Bob’s input bit y in the combined
one-time table, it is possible for a cheating Alice to do
a joint measurement on k received states from Bob, to
learn the information about y and r simultaneously as
much as possible (or y and y ⊕ r). Bob can deal with
this by testing more one-time tables. The resource usage
(the amount of entanglement needed and the amount of
communication) is estimated to be about O(tk2) times
that of Protocol 2, to achieve the similar level of privacy
for Bob, where t is the total number of one-time tables
required for the later main computation, and k is the size
of S in Protocol 4. In such factor tk2, one k is for the size
of S, and the additional tk factor means that about O(tk)
one-time tables are used in the instance of Protocol 2 in
the first step of Protocol 4. This factor appears because
Alice may use techniques similar to Grover’s algorithm to
increase the amount of information she may learn about
y, and the same input variable of Bob’s may appear in the
original circuit for at most t times. But in the case that
the function to be evaluated is for evaluating a program
provided by Bob on Alice’s data, it is possible that each
variable of Bob’s appears only once, then the t factor
can be omitted, so that the overhead becomes only O(k2)
compared to the plain use of Protocol 2.
The Protocol 4 differs from the previous protocols in
that it has an extra step of combining the one-time ta-
bles, and its usage in the later bipartite computation task
may be different by a switch of the roles of Alice and Bob.
The success of the quantum protocols is not guaranteed
in the presence of cheating, but this does not cause much
problem since cheating is caught with high probability,
and these protocols are in the preprocessing stage for
the overall computation, so the useful data is not leaked.
The failures in the quantum gates, measurements, and
entanglement generation or qubit transmissions in the
preprocessing stage can be tolerated by trial-and-error.
The failures in Protocol 1 are required to be reported in
the protocols, so they have no effect for the testing and
later computations. In some experimental implementa-
tions the failures might not be reported and might appear
as errors, and this would affect the security.
IV. APPLICATIONS IN TWO-PARTY
CLASSICAL COMPUTATION
The following Protocol 5 is for evaluating a linear poly-
nomial with distributed output using the quantum pre-
processing protocols introduced above. The linear poly-
nomial is of the form z = (c+
∑n
j=1 ajbj) mod 2, where
c is a constant bit known to Bob, and aj and bj are bits
on Alice and Bob’s side, respectively. The output is the
XOR of two bits on different sides.
If Protocol 2 is used in Protocol 5, the data privacy of
one party is partial. The leakage is about half of his or
her input bits. See also the comments after Protocol 6
below. Generally, we suggest using Protocol 3 in Pro-
tocol 5, since it at least aims for near-perfect security,
although the actual security level is linearly related with
noise.
For a generic boolean circuit, we propose Protocol 6.
The main computation after the preprocessing does not
include any aborts, and only requires the number of com-
munication rounds to be about equal to the circuit depth.
The circuit is assumed to be known to both parties, ex-
cept for some initial local gates, which may be known
only to the local party.
If Protocol 2 is used in Protocol 6 with the roles of Al-
ice and Bob switched in the preprocessing only, the data
privacy of Bob is partial. The leakage is about half of his
input bits in each polynomial. But the privacy is better
in the case that the function allows many different inputs
of Bob to give rise to the same result. In the case that
the function effectively evaluates a universal circuit with
data given by Alice and the logical circuit given by Bob,
his input has partial privacy which is acceptable due to
possible recompilations of Bob’s logical circuit. If Proto-
col 4 is used instead of Protocol 2, it is suggested that
Alice always be the first party, to save the required num-
ber of one-time tables when Alice’s data privacy is more
important than Bob’s data privacy. Then Alice’s data in
the main computation is asymptotically secure because
of the property of Protocol 4. The remarks above are for
the noiseless case. For the case with noise, see Sec. VII,
where it is suggested that simply using Protocol 3 may
be a good solution.
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Protocol 4 A protocol for generating improved one-time tables with combinations
1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 or Protocol 3 to obtain some one-time tables after checking. Suppose the instance
labeled by j has inputs aj and bj , and outputs ej and fj .
2. Bob determines which remaining one-time tables are to be combined into one new instance of one-time table, and tells
Alice his decision. Each new instance corresponds to a set S of old instances which satisfy that Bob’s input bits are equal
(denoted as b0). A new instance has inputs a
′ and b′, and outputs e′ and f ′, where a′ :=
∑
j∈S aj mod 2, b
′ := b0,
e′ :=
∑
j∈S ej mod 2, f
′ :=
∑
j∈S fj mod 2.
Protocol 5 A protocol for evaluating classical linear polynomials with distributed output using one-time tables
Input: n bits aj from Alice, and n bits bj from Bob, and a bit c known to Bob.
Output: a bit zA on Alice’s side and a bit zB on Bob’s side, such that z := zA ⊕ zB = (c+∑nj=1 ajbj) mod 2.
1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 or 3 or 4 to obtain n one-time tables.
2. For evaluating the linear polynomial z = (c+
∑n
j=1 ajbj) mod 2, Alice and Bob perform the evaluation of the nonlocal
AND gate for aj and bj using the procedure in Sec. II, with the output being distributed. They locally calculate the
XOR of all bits from the outputs, and Bob additionally takes the XOR with c. Each party obtains a bit as the output.
The Protocol 6 has a good property that cheating
would usually give rise to wrong results. If some party
(partially) cheated in generating some of the one-time
tables, so that some but not all of the one-time tables
used in Protocol 6 are not secure, then the insecure one-
time tables are wrong with some significant probability
according to Eq. (3): the calculation results for a par-
ticular nonlocal AND gate would often be incorrect after
the distributed output bits are recombined. This implies
that the final computation result has large probability to
be wrong. But if that party cheated in all the generated
one-time tables and passed the other party’s test, the
computation result could be calculated by the cheating
party alone with the help of the messages sent from the
other party in the main computation stage. The latter
case is not likely to happen, since the other party could
set a low threshold in the testing.
Some protocol similar to Protocol 6 could be used for
evaluating a public circuit on shared classical secrets be-
tween Alice and Bob, when each effective input bit is
the XOR of two remote bits. The steps are quite similar
except for some initial local gates, so we abbreviate the
protocol here.
In the following we discuss the security assumptions.
We define Bob to be “conservative”, if he values the pri-
vacy of his input data higher than the possibility to learn
Alice’s data.
First, let us assume that Bob honestly does the testing
in the Protocols 2 and 4. There could be superpositions
in the input and the output of these quantum protocols,
but in the later classical computation task, the parties
may do computational-basis measurements to force the
received superposed states to collapse. Note that one
party may insist on using the superposed output from
some instance of the one-time table, but when the other
party does some later gate using such output as an in-
put, the latter party may do computational-basis mea-
surements to force the collapse of the superposition.
Next, we discuss the case out of the assumption, that
is, Bob cheats in the quantum protocols. He may cheat
by not aborting after finding that Alice is cheating. This
way of cheating is not powerful by itself, but see the fol-
lowing for discussion about his combined ways of cheat-
ing. The second way for him to cheat is to use general
quantum input (allowing superpositions and entangle-
ment) for the one-time tables, which also allows general
quantum output for the one-time tables. In such case,
Alice may do computational-basis measurements in the
main bipartite computation stage to force the collapse of
superpositions. The case that he uses general quantum
output for the one-time tables is discussed in the previ-
ous paragraph. For the case that Bob combines the two
cheating methods above, if Alice is honest, Bob cannot
get more information about Alice’s data compared to the
case of him not cheating in this way. If Alice also cheats,
then it is possible that Bob’s knowledge about Alice’s
data on average is better (e.g. when they discard some
one-time tables, so that Bob obtains more information
about Alice’s input in the remaining one-time tables).
But that comes at the expense of the higher possible leak-
age of Bob’s data. So a conservative Bob should not do
such combined cheating. The third way for Bob to cheat
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Protocol 6 A protocol for evaluating publicly-known boolean circuits with private bipartite input using one-time
tables
1. Alice and Bob decompose the two-party circuit to be evaluated into some local circuits with AND, XOR gates, and some
linear polynomials with bipartite input, while adding possible ancillary bits with fixed initial values. Any nonlocal AND
gate in the original circuit is a special case of the linear polynomial.
2. For each AND gate not in the initial stage, the inputs may be distributed, i.e. one or both input bits are the XOR of two
remote bits. In the case that both input bits are distributed, Alice and Bob decompose such gate into the XOR of the
outputs of two local AND gates and two nonlocal AND gates, the latter being a special case of the linear polynomial. In
the case that only one input bit is distributed, they decompose such gate into the XOR of the outputs of a local AND
gate and a nonlocal AND gate. For any XOR gate where both input bits are distributed, it is decomposed into two
local XOR gates, with the output of the overall gate being distributed. For any XOR gate where only one input bit is
distributed, it is effectively one local XOR gate, with the output of the overall gate being distributed.
3. They perform the gates in the resulting circuit in pre-arranged order. The linear polynomials are evaluated using
Protocol 5 with distributed output.
4. At the end of the circuit, one party sends some bits to the other party so that the distributed bits for the output are
recombined to form the correct output; if there are output on two parties, both parties need to send messages.
is by using superposed states in the main computation
but not the preprocessing. This has no effect since Al-
ice may make a computational-basis measurement on the
state received from Bob in the main computation. Note
that Alice’s data leakage is limited by design of the quan-
tum protocols, except in the case of non-conservative Bob
discussed above. In conclusion, if we assume Bob to be
conservative, the quantum protocols are asymptotically
secure; if we assume Alice to be honest-but-curious, the
Protocol 4 is asymptotically secure for Alice (as men-
tioned in Sec. III), and in such case it does not make
much sense for Bob to cheat since he cannot gain from
cheating.
In the following we consider implementing some cryp-
tographic primitives such as oblivious transfer and bit
commitment. The (Rabin) oblivious transfer (as opposed
to 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer) [29, 30], can be imple-
mented in a cheat-sensitive way (i.e. any cheating will
probably cause the protocol to abort) as follows. Again,
it requires that one of the parties be conservative, in or-
der for the one-time tables to be successfully and securely
generated.
Protocol 7 A check-based quantum protocol for
approximate cheat-sensitive oblivious transfer
1. Alice and Bob run an instance of Protocol 5 with the
polynomial of the form z = a · b (i.e. with only one
variable and no constant term).
2. Alice sends her part of the output to Bob. Bob takes
the XOR of the received bit with his output bit, and
the result is the final output.
In Protocol 7, suppose Alice’s input is a and Bob’s in-
put is b. If b = 0, the resulting product z = a · b is 0
and does not carry any information about a; otherwise,
the result is a, so it transfers Alice’s input bit to Bob.
The protocol is cheat-sensitive in the sense that if Alice
cheated in the step of generation of the one-time table,
it would have been detected and the protocol would have
aborted. The protocol has approximate security, since
the precomputed one-time tables are approximately se-
cure.
We then consider 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. By
choosing the linear polynomial of the type z =∑2
j=1 ajbj , where b1 + b2 = 1, and if Bob asks Alice
to send him the output she obtained from running the
Protocol 5, Bob may accomplish the same function as 1-
out-of-2 oblivious transfer, with the additional property
that Bob may ask Alice to send a1⊕a2 if he cheats by set-
ting b1 = b2 = 1. The last point makes it different from
the definition of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [29, 30].
There are some no-go theorems for quantum bit com-
mitment [31, 32]. Since our quantum preprocessing pro-
tocols allow aborts, and there are some requirements on
the players in those protocols, it is still possible that bit
commitment can be implemented with the help of the
one-time tables generated by the quantum preprocessing
protocols. In the Protocol 8 we propose a bit commit-
ment protocol inspired by a computationally-secure con-
struction based on quantum one-way permutations [33].
Here, instead of using the quantum one-way permuta-
tions, we use a special bipartite classical computation
with distributed output, with the help of quantum pre-
12
processing. Our scheme is cheat-sensitive and subject to
some other assumptions similar to those for the generic
Protocol 6. It requires that one of the parties be conser-
vative.
Protocol 8 A check-based quantum protocol for
approximate cheat-sensitive bit commitment
1. Alice and Bob perform Protocol 4 to obtain some one-
time tables with the degree of security dependent on re-
source usage. They decide on a large integer m related
to the intended security of the current bit commitment
protocol.
2. Suppose Alice wants to commit a bit b. She asks Bob
to together calculate m nonlocal AND gates using the
method in Sec. II, with her input bits being always b,
but Bob’s inputs are random bits chosen by himself.
They obtain some distributed bits as the outcomes.
This completes the commit phase.
3. (Reveal phase) Alice sends Bob her output in the in-
stances of the nonlocal AND gates in the previous step.
Bob takes the XOR for the corresponding pairs of bits
to recover the results of the nonlocal AND gates. From
these results, Bob finds out b, or decides that Alice has
cheated by sending him some random bit string so he
cannot recover b.
In the last step of Protocol 8, if Alice sends Bob some
random bit string, the results obtained by Bob are gen-
erally not consistent with any input value of b. For large
m, it is hard for Alice to guess the appropriate bit string
that could make Bob believe the input was 1 − b. The
reason is as follows. There are 2m possible bit strings of
length m representing the results of the nonlocal AND
gates (called “outcome strings” below). In the generic
case that Bob did not use all zero values for the m in-
put bits for the nonlocal AND gates, one of the outcome
strings corresponds to the input value b, while a differ-
ent outcome string corresponds to the input value 1− b,
and all other 2m− 2 outcome strings are meaningless for
Bob. And since Alice does not know Bob’s inputs (which
we assume to be randomly distributed among the 2m− 1
nonzero m-bit strings) nor his part of the outcome string,
she has probability of 12m−1 of correctly guessing her part
of the outcome string corresponding to the input value
1 − b. In the remaining case that Bob had used m in-
puts bits that are all zero, Alice’s input b does not affect
the outcome string which is the all-zero string, so Bob
cannot distinguish between the case b = 0 and the case
b = 1, and therefore he should not have chosen such all-
zero string as his input. The above analysis means that
Bob has an allowed strategy such that a cheating Alice
has probability 12m−1 of success in trying to change the
committed bit after the making the commit.
V. APPLICATIONS IN TWO-PARTY
QUANTUM COMPUTATION
The methods in this work can be applied in two-party
secure quantum computing tasks. When such tasks have
classical input and output, they also serve as classical
tasks of the type discussed in Sec. IV, but with quan-
tum implementations. In this way, classical computa-
tional tasks are completed with quantum speedup and
quantum security advantage. But this requires at least
one party to have quantum capabilities beyond those re-
quired by Protocol 1. A typical problem in two-party
quantum computation is quantum homomorphic encryp-
tion (QHE). In this work we present an interactive QHE
scheme, and a constant-round QHE scheme. The main
part of the constant-round scheme has three stages of
communication, instead of two in the usual definition of
QHE. The initial preparation of the one-time tables with
checking and preparation of entanglement also involve a
constant number of stages of communication.
In the QHE schemes below, there are some polynomials
with at least 2n variables, where n is the number of qubits
in Alice’s input. The 2n variables correspond to Pauli
masks in Alice’s teleportation of the input data to Bob.
The way Bob changes the coefficients of the polynomials
is called coefficient-update rules below. The coefficient-
update rules for the first 2n variables (and other variables
mentioned below) under the action of Clifford gates can
be easily obtained from the following relations:
PX = iXZP, PZ = ZP,
HX = ZH, HZ = XH,
CNOT12(X
a
1Z
b
1 ⊗ Xc2Zd2) = (Xa1Zb⊕d1 ⊗ Xa⊕c2 Zd2)CNOT12,
(12)
where the ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and in the gate
CNOT12, the qubit 1 is the control. The coefficient-
update rules for the variables under the T gate can be
obtained from the relations
TZ = ZT, TX = e−pii/4PXZT. (13)
The coefficient-update rules are analogous to the key-
update rules in [10, 11], but here the coefficients, rather
than the Pauli keys (the variables), are updated.
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An interactive QHE scheme with almost optimal
information-theoretic data privacy and circuit privacy is
obtainable by using the method in Protocol 5 to evaluate
classical linear polynomials, and using the latter as a
subprocedure in the Scheme 4 in [26]. We describe the
steps as follows.
Scheme 1 (An interactive QHE scheme using precom-
puted one-time tables)
1. Alice and Bob produce a large number of one-time
tables.
2. Alice teleports her n input data qubits to Bob with-
out telling him any Pauli corrections. The 2n bits
indicating the Pauli corrections are part of the vari-
ables in the polynomials to be evaluated.
3. For each stage of the circuit consisting of some Clif-
ford gates and a T gate, the two parties do the fol-
lowing: Bob calculates the coefficients (including
the constant term) in the linear polynomial to be
used for deciding the P† correction after the T gate.
Alice and Bob each does their own part of opera-
tions in Protocol 5 to evaluate the current linear
polynomial, which has 2n variables. This includes
each party takes the XOR of the variables (or coef-
ficients) with the input of some unique one-time ta-
ble, and sends the resulting bits to the other party,
and then each party calculates a bit as a part of the
distributed outcome of the linear polynomial. Ac-
cording to the local outcome bit, each party does
his or her part of the operations in a garden-hose
gadget (shown in Appendix C). The result for a
Bell-state measurement corresponding to a XjZk
correction is recorded as two bits j and k. The
measurement outcomes on Alice’s side are part of
the variables of the later polynomials.
4. After the last T gate, Bob performs the last Clif-
ford gates in the desired circuit, and calculates his
coefficients in the last polynomials for calculating
the final Pauli masks. He does his part in evalu-
ating those polynomials, while Alice also does her
part. This includes each party sending the XOR of
variables (or coefficients) with the local input bit
in one-time tables. Each party obtains a bit, and
the XOR of these two bits is the intended outcome
of the polynomial. Bob teleports his output state
to Alice while modifying the correction bits in the
teleportation by taking the XOR of those correc-
tion bits with his part of the outcomes for the last
polynomials.
5. Alice corrects the received state from teleportation
with the corresponding Pauli operators, which are
determined from Bob’s message as well as her part
of the output of the last polynomials. The resulting
state is the final quantum output.
The following is an estimate of the resource cost of
Scheme 1. Suppose R is an upper bound on the number
of T gates in the circuit to be evaluated. The number
of variables in a linear polynomial is at most 2n + 4R.
The factor 4 is from that each Bell-state measurement
has two outcome bits, and Alice has two Bell-state mea-
surements in each gadget. As there are R + 2n linear
polynomials to be evaluated, and each variable requires
a one-time table in the evaluation of a polynomial, the
total number of consumed one-time tables is O(n2 +R2).
This is much smaller than the constant-round Scheme 2
below, which has cost exponential in the T-gate depth
of the circuit. We still introduce Scheme 2 since there
are interpolations between the Scheme 1 and the Scheme
2, giving rise to some tradeoff between the number of
rounds and the resource cost: the number of rounds may
be fewer than in the interactive scheme, while the num-
ber of required one-time tables may be higher. This is
achieved by running the Scheme 2 for a segment of the
circuit, and the two parties interact, and proceed to the
next segment.
The Scheme 2 below is a three-message QHE scheme,
with the main structure modified from some scheme
with non-ideal security in [26]. A main technique of the
scheme is to use a simplified version of a garden-hose
gadget from [11] (and attached in Appendix C). The
main part of the scheme has three stages of classical
communication: from Bob to Alice, and from Alice to
Bob, and a final teleportation from Bob to Alice. The
schemes requires using some linear polynomials of the
form in Protocol 5, but also some nonlinear polynomials,
which can also be treated as linear polynomials (with the
variables being the product of some original variables)
in order to apply Protocol 5. The construction of
the scheme depends on the following property: Bob’s
coefficients of the (nonlinear) polynomials (the constant
term is not included here) do not depend on Alice’s
original Pauli mask bits or her measurement outcomes
in the garden-hose gadgets. The latter independence is
possible because we include Alice’s previous measure-
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ment outcomes and her original Pauli mask bits, as well
as her input bit for the garden-hose gadgets as variables.
The XOR of Alice’s and Bob’s inputs for a garden-hose
gadget correspond to a polynomial of previous variables,
thus Bob’s input to any garden-hose gadget can be ex-
pressed as a (nonlinear) polynomial of previous variables
XORed with Alice’s input to this garden-hose gadget,
the latter being a new variable. Then the coefficients
of Bob can be effectively regarded as independent of
Alice’s variables. Given the above choice of variables,
the constant terms in the polynomials are determined
by Bob’s local measurement outcomes in his part of the
garden-hose gadgets.
Scheme 2 (A three-message high-cost QHE scheme
using precomputed one-time tables)
1. Alice and Bob produce a large number of one-time
tables.
2. Bob calculates the XOR of each coefficient in the
(nonlinear) polynomials with his input in a unique
precomputed one-time table, and sends the result-
ing bits, and the labels for the corresponding one-
time tables to Alice.
3. Alice teleports her n input data qubits to Bob with-
out telling him any Pauli corrections. The 2n bits
indicating the Pauli corrections are part of the vari-
ables in the polynomials to be evaluated. With
the received message, Alice computes her part of
the output of the (nonlinear) polynomials using the
one-time tables, based on the method in Protocol 5.
Alice records her part of the output of a (nonlin-
ear) polynomial as a new variable, and according
to its value, she does some appropriate P† gate fol-
lowed by Bell-state measurements in the garden-
hose gadgets (shown in Appendix C). The result
for a Bell-state measurement corresponding to a
XjZk correction is recorded as two bits j and k.
The measurement outcomes are part of the vari-
ables of the later polynomials. She calculates the
XOR of each term in the next polynomial and her
input bit in a unique one-time table, and sends the
resulting bits to Bob. She proceeds to do this until
she reaches the end of the circuit, including send-
ing messages about the last 2n polynomials for the
Pauli corrections.
4. Bob receives Alice’s message and calculates his out-
put for the first polynomial (which is linear) using
Protocol 5. The Bob part of the output of the first
polynomial decides which measurements he should
do in the first garden-hose gadget. He performs
the Clifford gates and the T gate before the first
garden-hose gadget, and performs the appropriate
measurements in the first garden-hose gadget. The
outcomes of those measurements help determine
the constant term in the later (nonlinear) polyno-
mials. He continues to do the next batch of gates
and measurements. He evaluates some (nonlinear)
polynomial, and according to his part of the output
value of such polynomial, he performs the appropri-
ate measurements in the corresponding garden-hose
gadget. After the last T gate, Bob does his part in
evaluating the last polynomials for calculating the
final Pauli masks. The outcomes of those polyno-
mials are distributed as the XOR of bits on the
two parties. Bob teleports his output state to Al-
ice while modifying the correction bits in the tele-
portation by taking the XOR with his part of the
outcomes of the last polynomials.
5. Alice corrects the received state from teleportation
using the corresponding Pauli gates, which are de-
termined from Bob’s message as well as her part of
the output of the last polynomials. The resulting
state is the final quantum output.
We analyze the resource cost of Scheme 2. The number
of variables in the first polynomial is 2n, but the second
polynomial would be nonlinear and has 2n+ (2n+ 1)× 4
terms apart from the constant term. The term 1 in the
brackets is for Alice’s input bit of the garden-hose gadget.
Suppose the k-th polynomial has f(k) terms apart from
the constant term. Then f(k) = f(k − 1) + [f(k − 1) +
1]× 4 when k > 1, so when k = R, the number of terms
is O(n · 5R). There are R polynomials (corresponding
to the T gates) which follow the induction rule above.
But the last 2n polynomials do not follow the rule, and
they do not increase any number of variables compared
to previous polynomials, because they are for the Pauli
corrections after a Clifford circuit. Thus the total number
of consumed one-time tables is O(n2 · 5R).
The security of the Schemes 1 and 2 are optimal if
the one-time tables have ideal security, where “optimal”
means that Alice may learn information about Bob’s in-
put from the final output only, and Bob learns nothing at
all about Alice’s input. But in fact, the one-time tables
have partial security, due to the finite number of checks
and the noise (including errors), so the security of the
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scheme above is partial. See also the discussion below.
There are two points on which the security of two-party
quantum computation may be somewhat weaker than in
classical two-party computation based on the similar pro-
cedures for generating one-time tables. First, it is less
natural in the quantum protocol to impose classicality of
the output of the one-time table. Imposing classicality of
course helps security, but it is not necessary given our as-
sumptions about the players in the preprocessing stage.
In practice, we may assume that the output of the one-
time tables have decohered prior to the use in the main
computation. Second, in the Schemes 1 or 2 given above,
the Pauli masks for the original input qubits are used as
the variables in all the polynomials involved, this means
the data privacy is worse than in the case of classical bi-
partite computation, in which the intermediate variables
replace the roles of the initial variables in many of the
linear polynomials. But the use of the quantum prepro-
cessing in this work would give rise to better data privacy
than some of the schemes in later parts of [26], because
those schemes require correlated encoding of the differ-
ent variables, while the variables in the current work are
encoded independently by the one-time tables.
We now consider two-party computations in which the
circuit is known to Bob only, and each party has some
private (quantum) input data. A simple extension of the
interactive QHE scheme works, where the extension is
just by adding some input qubits on Bob’s side. These
qubits are not subject to any Pauli masks.
In the following we consider two-party quantum com-
putations with publicly known circuit and private quan-
tum inputs on both parties. One method is to use the
simple extension of the interactive QHE scheme as in the
last paragraph. A simplified method is to make use of
the fact that the circuit is publicly known. We briefly
describe it below.
Since the circuit is publicly known, those one-time ta-
bles for the linear polynomial for the first P† correction
after the first T gate are not needed, since Alice can cal-
culate by herself the contributions to this P† correction
due to her original Pauli masks. She could just tell Bob
before the protocol starts to choose a fixed input on his
side in the first garden-hose gadget, then she could decide
her input for this gadget on her own. But Bob’s measure-
ment outcomes in the garden-hose gadgets are not known
to Alice, and they should affect the subsequent P† correc-
tions. Hence, in later garden-hose gadgets, Bob’s input
cannot be fixed, and the rest of the scheme is similar to
the interactive scheme, but with some extra (quantum)
input data on Bob’s side. In the case that Alice’s input
is classical, the initial teleportation can be replaced with
classical communication with withheld bit-flip masks. If
the output is on Bob’s side, Bob need not send any mes-
sage after Alice’s message, and Alice sends him some bits
for Pauli corrections at the end. In the case that the out-
put is on Alice’s side and is classical, the final telepor-
tation from Bob to Alice can be replaced with classical
communication without any masks.
VI. APPLICATION IN CHECK-BASED
IMPLEMENTATION OF NO-SIGNALING
CORRELATIONS WITH THE HELP OF INERT
COMMUNICATION
The Protocol 9 for generating the one-time tables to-
gether with Protocol 3 for checking them effectively im-
plement the PR-box (Popescu-Rohrlich box [34]) type
of correlations. The implementation needs time in com-
munication, and involves some inert communication, i.e.
sending of some classical messages which do not contain
useful information about the inputs (in the “useful” one-
time tables, but not in those one-time tables subject to
checks and not actually used). So this is not a direct
implementation of the PR box, which must be instanta-
neous. Rather, it is a check-based implementation of the
PR-box type of correlations with time cost and inert com-
munication cost. The fact that it is check-based implies
that it is not a deterministic protocol, but forced almost-
deterministic, meaning that the checking party could set
the threshold to very low so that the other party must
be nearly completely honest to avoid aborting, and if
the parties are indeed nearly completely honest, the pro-
tocol is almost deterministic. However, in Protocol 9,
after the initial entanglement has been established, the
two directions of teleportation and partial sending of the
measurement outcomes can be done simultaneously. This
does have some partial flavor of “instantaneous” imple-
mentation.
In the following, we show how to implement the fol-
lowing general type of no-signaling correlations in [35] in
the check-based way.
P (A⊕B = ab|a, b) = 1
2
(1 + E), (14)
with 0 ≤ E ≤ 1. According to an argument in [36]
(also mentioned in [35]), the form (14) is representative
of a large class of no-signaing correlations (those with in-
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put and output dimensions 2 on both sides). The way
to implement the no-signaling correlations above is sim-
ilar to the implementation of the PR-box correlations
above, but with an additional step in those instances of
Protocol 9 not subject to checking but used for the fi-
nal correlations: Bob randomly flips his output bit with
probability 12 (1 − E). Such probabilistic step is not in-
volved in the instances of Protocol 9 subject to checking,
so Protocol 3 still applies, although with the output cor-
relations changed. A drawback of such implementation
is that Bob knows the original value of his output bit,
so he may recover a PR-box type of no-signaling cor-
relation. A non-perfect way of dealing with this is to
change the last step to that Alice and Bob both flip the
respective output bit with some probability p = 1−
√
E
2 so
that (1 − p)2 + p2 = 1+E2 . Such modified protocol still
has the similar drawback that one party could recover a
no-signaling correlation with parameter larger than in-
tended.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
1. Extensions of protocols
The qubit-based quantum protocols in this work can
be generalized to work for qudits in principle. This is
inspired by the classical case in [4]. This requires some
changes in the classical usage of the generated correla-
tions.
The methods in this work are extendable to multipar-
tite classical computation in principle. Some pairs of
parties (possibly including some server) may prepare one-
time tables using the quantum protocols in this work.
A method of enhancing the security by additional
checks after the computation is as follows. If one party,
say Alice, does not require the long-term security of her
input in the main computation, Bob may ask her to do
additional checking of the one-time tables used in the
main computation, at a time such that her input data is
no longer sensitive, to make sure that she has not cheated
by a lot. Of course, in some practical applications, the
final computation result provides some check against Al-
ice’s cheating, since Alice usually has to cheat all the way
to the end for a generic computation to be correct (pro-
vided that the final result is on her side, not distributed
as the XOR of remote bits), and always cheating success-
fully is unlikely to happen because of the inequalities in
Sec. III.
Due to experimental limitations and the overhead from
the checkings, the number of one-time tables generated
by our quantum protocols may be insufficient if a large
two-party computation is to be performed. In that case,
it is possible to use some classical processing of the
quantum-generated one-time tables, to generate more
one-time tables with computational security. Note that
extensions of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfers is studied in
[37], but our one-time tables correspond to the original
oblivious transfer, rather than 1-out-of-2 oblivious trans-
fer. Nonetheless, some similar method of extension of the
quantum-generated one-time tables might be possible.
2. Physical implementations of Protocol 1
The Protocols 1 and 9 differ in that the latter in-
volves remote state preparation using shared entangle-
ment, while in the former protocol, Alice directly sends
two qubits. After receiving them, Bob does a CNOT gate
or the identity, and applies some Pauli gates to the two
qubits, and sends the two qubits back to Alice. The
shared entanglement in Protocol 9 could be prepared by
a fixed entanglement-generating device, allowing for fail-
ures in preparation (although we allow failures in the
whole Protocol 9, so failures in any particular step is
not of much concern). This may also help getting rid of
the issue of multiple photons in direct communication,
which would harm Bob’s data privacy (although some
schemes with the direct sending of photons may also al-
low the detection of multiple photons). Using generation
of entanglement could also increase the allowed distance
between Alice and Bob, if the entanglement is generated
by a device at the middle, compared to using direct send-
ing. As for detector inefficiencies and dark counts, the
fact that the Protocol 1 can be redone after failure can
help mitigate the effects of these issues. The appeal of
the direct sending approach is significant, due to that
only two qubits are used (although the optical imple-
mentation of the CNOT gate with checking for multiple
photons may involve some ancillary qubits), and failure
of the whole Protocol 1 is allowed, making the optical
implementations worth considering.
3. Effects of noise and errors
If direct sending of photons is used in Protocol 1, we
suggest using the known methods such as decoherence-
free subspaces or quantum codes, to reduce or prevent
the errors in the transmission. We leave the details for
future work. In the following, we analyze the theoretical
impact of noise (including errors) on our protocols.
We consider the case that the main computation is
classical, since the quantum case is similar in that it also
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involves evaluating classical linear polynomials. When
Protocol 2 with noise is used for a bipartite classical com-
putation task, and if Alice’s data privacy is more impor-
tant than Bob’s, we suggest that Alice who is the first
party in the main computation be the second party in the
preprocessing. Then the data leakage of Alice is about
the product of the circuit size (the number of the one-
time tables) and a small constant indicating the noise
level. This is because in Protocol 2, the physical errors
and the first party’s cheating look about the same for the
second party in the verifications (the “first party” in this
sentence is the Bob in the main computation). For cir-
cuits with a high level of parallelism, the data leakage of
Alice per input bit is about the product of circuit depth
and the error constant described above. So the allowed
circuit depth is a constant, which is inverse proportional
to the error constant. Similar remarks can be said for
Protocol 3 for both sides.
If Protocol 4 based on Protocol 2 is used for a bipartite
classical computation task, we suggest that Alice be the
first party both in the preprocessing and the main com-
putation. The noise level is almost not related to the data
privacy of Alice, which is exponentially good as the num-
ber of one-time tables used in Protocol 4 increases. The
noise mainly affects the correctness of the computation,
and Bob’s data privacy. If the noise level is not too low,
Bob’s data privacy in Protocol 4 would not be too good,
since he has some identical inputs, and Alice could try to
learn partially about each of them to recover his true in-
put. Bob could check more one-time tables to deal with
this problem. Thus some polynomial overhead is needed
to achieve the similar privacy of Bob’s as in Protocol 2.
An alternative would be simply using Protocol 3. A more
complicated method is using Protocol 4 with “recompi-
lation”, that is, using some new publicly-known function
instead of the original function, with Bob’s input changed
accordingly, while Alice’s input is unchanged, so that the
result is the same as the original function with the origi-
nal input of Bob. If the new function is chosen so that it
encodes universal classical circuits, and the possible new
inputs of Bob are long enough, we can achieve a good
level of security for Bob’s input. Such recompilation can
be done by classical preprocessing.
There have been studies of the effects of noise in clas-
sical cryptographic tasks, and noise is not always bad
for security [38]. Note that adding some assumptions
about quantum capabilities may improve the security in
bit commitment [39]. Adding similar assumptions on top
of our quantum preprocessing protocols may improve the
security in the applications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed some quantum protocols for approx-
imately generating a certain type of classical correlations
(a special case of the one-time tables [4]) with varying
degrees of privacy, to be used in bipartite secure com-
putation tasks. We have shown how to use the gener-
ated one-time tables in evaluating linear polynomials and
generic boolean circuits, and in cheat-sensitive oblivious
transfer and cheat-sensitive bit commitment, as well as
in (interactive) quantum homomorphic encryption and
general two-party secure quantum computation. In the
discussions we have mentioned that our method gives a
check-based implementation of the PR-box type of cor-
relations, but with some communication time cost, and
involves sending of classical messages which do not con-
tain useful information about the inputs, so it is not
a direct implementation of the PR box. Some other
no-signaling correlations can also be generated in the
checked-based way with the help of similar classical com-
munications. Open problems include: applications in
check-based cheat-sensitive quantum implementation of
other cryptographic primitives, which may be weaker
than the plain version of the primitives; whether there
is a constant-round QHE scheme with costs polynomial
in circuit size; a refined analysis of the protocols, taking
into account the physical errors in quantum states and
operations; fault-tolerance; application to special classes
of circuits or functions; design of experimental schemes.
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Appendix A: An entanglement-based version of
Protocol 1
In this appendix we introduce Protocol 9 which is a
variant of Protocol 1 based on initial entanglement. It
contains only communication from Bob to Alice after the
entanglement is established. It does not explicitly con-
tain classical communication from Alice to Bob. But this
is because the input x is generated by the measurement
in the protocol. If x were generated by Alice before the
protocol, one bit of classical communication from Alice to
Bob would be needed. For the procedure of testing that
the entangled states are indeed EPR pairs, we suggest us-
ing a method similar to that using the CHSH inequality
in [40], which is for testing the singlet state, but note that
we need to leave some EPR pairs untested for later use in
our protocol. There are other ways of testing, in which
each party measures in one of some different bases, and
then the two parties compare notes. These methods gen-
erally contain aborts. In Protocol 9, Bob generates the
entanglement, since no explicit communication is from
Alice to Bob in the protocol (although Alice’s input x
implicitly becomes partially known to Bob), so he is less
motivated to cheat in entanglement generation.
Note that in studying the security of Protocol 9, if
Alice’s (cheating) strategy is such that she does not do
any operation (including measurement) on her later two
qubits before Bob does anything, Alice’s first two qubits
could be viewed as the purification system for Bob’s first
two qubits, thus the security analysis of Protocol 1 (al-
lowing initial hidden ancillae of Alice’s entangled with
the sent state) can basically be applied to the analysis of
Protocol 9 in such case. But if Alice could do a Z-basis
measurement on her later two qubits and select only cer-
tain outcomes while declaring the instances with other
outcomes as “failed” to Bob, she could have an advantage
in imposing Bob’s measurement outcomes on his later
two qubits, and thus she could learn Bob’s output bit r.
(The Z-basis measurement on the two qubits could also
be replaced with a coarse-grained measurement revealing
only Bob’s output bit r.) A remedy for such case is that
Bob could observe the correlations between the failed in-
stances declared by Alice and his measurement outcomes
on the later two qubits, to find out if Alice cheated in
this way. But Alice could do other measurements on her
four qubits initially, and declare the instances with some
measurement outcomes as failed instances. We expect
that such cheating can at most partially help Alice learn
about Bob’s output bit r, but could still help her learn
Bob’s input y (sometimes completely). Similar observa-
tions by Bob on the correlations between failed instances
and his measurement outcomes could still be helpful in
this case. Even with such checking, there are still some
measurement strategies of Alice that we have not studied
in detail. Thus, the security of Protocol 9 is weaker than
that of Protocol 1.
Appendix B: Numerical results for the quantum
protocols
Numerical calculations confirm the inequalities (1)
through (3). Note the same M occurs twice in each in-
equality. The calculations assume that Bob’s received a
two-qubit mixed state from Alice. This is modeled with
a pure state on four qubits, according to the Schmidt
decomposition. The calculations assume projective mea-
surements by Alice after she receives the message from
Bob, although POVM measurements may give rise to a
larger sum on the left-hand-side, and such weakness is
remedied by the calculation of the Holevo bound below.
Numerical calculations suggest the following inequalities.
χy + χr ≤ c, (B1)
χy + χy⊕r ≤ c, (B2)
where c is a constant somewhat larger than 1.388 and is
yet to be precisely determined. This implies that
χy + max(χr, χy⊕r) ≤ c. (B3)
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Protocol 9 An entanglement-based quantum protocol for generating one-time tables
Input: A random bit x generated in the protocol by Alice, and a random bit y that Bob generates before the protocol.
Output: (x · y)⊕ r and r on the two sides, where r is a random bit.
The input and output together form the one-time table.
1. After some procedure of generating EPR states and testing them, the two parties share four tested EPR pairs. Bob
generates and distributes the entanglement. The testing procedure, which may contain aborts on failure of passing the
tests, is discussed in the text.
2. (The steps 3 and 4 performed by Bob can be done concurrently with the Step 2 performed by Alice.) Alice generates a
random bit s. If s = 0, she measures the four qubits in her part of the EPR pairs in the Z basis, and records the
measurement outcome on the first qubit as x; if s = 1, she measures these four qubits in the X basis, and records her
measurement outcome on the second qubit as x. The states |+〉 and |−〉 are regarded as 0 and 1, respectively, in the
recording. The XOR of the measurement outcomes on the three remaining qubits is recorded as g.
3. If y = 0, Bob does a CNOT gate on his first two qubits, with the first qubit being the control qubit.
4. Bob teleports his first two qubits to Alice, using the later two EPR pairs, while withholding part of the information
about the measurement outcomes: he calculates the XOR of the four correction bits, and sends the resulting bit w to
Alice. Bob calculates the XOR of the two bits for X corrections (although they actually correspond to σy corrections
due to the sending of a bit above) on the two qubits, and records the result as his output for the protocol.
5. Alice calculates her output bit: g ⊕ (s · w).
Numerics suggest that near the ends of the tradeoff
curve indicated by Eqs. B1 and B2, one quantity ap-
proaches 1 bit while the other quantity approaches 0.
For some of Bob’s received state that approaches the nu-
merically found maximal value of the left-hand-side, the
two terms on the left-hand-side of Eq. (B3) are about
equal, and the corresponding sum in the left-hand-side
of Eq. (3) under projective measurements is numerically
found to be not greater than 1 bit. The latter sum is
observed to have the same property for initial states sat-
isfying max(χr, χy⊕r) ≈ 1. When there is no ancilla, nu-
merics suggest that the left-hand-side of Eq. (B3) is not
greater than 1 bit. As quantitative examples for Eq. (5),
we have f(0.1) ≈ 0.3, and f(0.01) ≈ 0.06. An illustration
of Eq. (B3) by numerical calculations is in Fig. 1.
Appendix C: The garden-hose gadget that corrects
an unwanted P gate
The Fig. 2 shows a simplified version of a gadget in
[11] for correcting an unwanted P gate due to a T gate
in the circuit with certain prior Pauli corrections. The
input qubit starts from the position “in”, and ends up
in a qubit which is initially maximally entangled with
Bob’s qubit labeled “E” [in the state 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)].
The unwanted P on this qubit is corrected, but some
other Pauli corrections are now needed because of the
Bell-state measurements. These Pauli corrections are to
be accounted for in the later evaluation of polynomials.
Note that in each use of this gadget, some of the Bell-
FIG. 1: An illustration of Eq. (B3) by numerical calculations.
The two axes are the Holevo bounds for 500000 random mixed
states received by Bob from Alice on two qubits, which is
modeled by a pure state on four qubits including two ancillary
qubits. Horizontal axis (H1): max(χr, χy⊕r); vertical axis
(H2): χy.
state measurements are not actually performed. Alice’s
two Bell-state measurements are on the same pairs of
qubits irrespective of q.
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FIG. 2: A simplified version of a gadget in [11] for applying
a P† to a qubit initially at the position “in” if and only if
p + q = 1 (mod 2), using the “garden hose” method. The
dots connected by wavy lines are EPR pairs. The curved
lines are for Bell-state measurements. For example, if p = 0
and q = 1, the qubit is teleported through the first and the
third EPR pairs, with a P† applied to it by Alice in between.
The transformed state of the input qubit always ends up in
a qubit on Bob’s side which is initially maximally entangled
with the qubit labeled “E” [in the state 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)].
